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1. Introduction 
 
The multiple crises which have been facing the European Union since the initial outbreak of 
the financial and economic crisis in 2008 have created a new layer of obstacles for the 
world’s largest project of regional integration. Previously existing problems, furthermore, 
have been sidelined and in many cases deepened. One of the – if not the – most important 
pre-2008 problem is the democratic deficit within the European Union. In order to overcome 
all the current obstacles for European integration, this problem – which has been both 
overshadowed and enhanced by the eurocrisis – must be adequately addressed.  
The extent of the democratic deficit has been extensively researched and its 
underlying causes have partially been addressed with the Treaty of Lisbon. This treaty, for 
the first time in the history of the EU, clearly makes democratic provisions in its title. 
Moreover, the main institutional changes made by the treaty encompass an increase of 
capabilities of the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments, and introduces 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) (Mayoral, 2011). The Treaty aims at improving both the 
participatory and representative democratic value of the Union. To what extent these 
changes have improved democratization within the EU remains a major point of debate.  
I will address this fundamental question of European integration by addressing the 
question: ‘How has the Lisbon Treaty affected the various dimensions of the democratic 
deficit within the European Union, and how can this deficit be resolved effectively?’ To 
answer this question, the extent of the democratic deficit in the European Union and its 
causes will first be discussed. Moreover, there will be a focus on the necessary EU strategies 
and policies to generate tangible and extensive democratization of the EU. This, first and 
foremost, is grounded in the institutional changes made by the Lisbon Treaty, and also 
includes the current endeavors to overcome the ongoing eurocrisis. In its foundation, this 
work will research the progress made in democratizing the EU by testing the organization’s 
performance on the different dimensions of its democratic deficit. Moreover, I will outline a 
counterfactual analysis theorizing on the possible effects of further integration. On the basis 
of the findings, I will consequently reflect on the possible solutions to the democratic deficit. 
Further integration has turned out to be a key indicator in this regard.  
It is important to consider that a democratic deficit is not the only challenge facing 
further European integration. Crises, just as wars, fundamentally disrupt the status quo, and 
bring opportunities for change which in normal times is hardly possible; crises, furthermore, 
arrive because challenges are not adequately met (Fischer, 2012: 1). The eurocrisis may, 
therefore, form an excellent opportunity to comprehensively address the broader problems in 
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the European Union. Filling the democratic deficit is an important part of any comprehensive 
solution. 
 
2. The Democratic Deficit in the EU 
 
The democratic deficit within the European Union has been the topic of extensive and often  
Parallel debates. Differences in opinions and types of debate go back to the core 
understanding of democracy. Those who value liberal democracy tend to put the emphasis 
on representation through voting, and are more skeptical about the EU’s democratic deficit 
(Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007: 2). Scholars who put more focus on deliberative democracy 
value political communication within civil society and the emergence of autonomous public 
spheres. In this light it’s often argued that the unique nature of the European Union, as a 
step away from the nation-state, warrants a new form of democracy (Moravcsik, 2004).  
These debates, more widely analyzed, fit into the growing discussion about the 
democratic deficit in world politics in general (Moravcsik, 2004: 337). Within international, 
intergovernmental and supranational organizations there generally exists a smaller emphasis 
on democracy. Moravcsik (2004) contests that international organization – among which the 
European Union – can become an ideal democratic system. An approximation of this ‘real 
world’ democracy, therefore, should be the goal. This contention holds that there might not 
be a democratic deficit in the EU due to its unique nature. However, when following the 
general opinion that there is a democratic deficit:  which forms does this deficit take?  
 
2.1. Five Claims about the Democratic Deficit 
 
There are five main claims regarding the democratic deficit in the European Union. The 
majority of powers in the EU, first, lies with the executive on national and European level, 
and the actions of these executive agents at the European level are beyond the control of 
national parliaments (Follesdal & Hix, 2006: 535). This suggests that the influence of voters 
is less substantial. As a consequence of this, second, the European Parliament is too weak: 
even though the powers of the EP have grown in several reform attempts, such as the 
treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, and most recently with the Lisbon Treaty, the 
institution is still less powerful than its peers (mainly the Commission). Third, EU politics are 
too distant from its citizens: a complex and abstract policy process, in combination with a 
lack of elected leadership facilities a growing disconnect between citizen and governor (Hix, 
2008).  
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Fourth, there are no real European elections: national governments are elected, as 
well as the European Parliament, but these elections are mainly decided on national issues 
instead of on the European policy debate; they are ‘second-order national contests’ 
(Follesdal & Hix, 2006: 535-536; Reif & Schmitt, 1980). This has two core consequences: (1) 
elections are regarded as less important, which decreases the turnout, and (2) national 
factors, such as discontent with the incumbent government, play a large role, leading to 
more votes for small and main opposition parties. Lastly, related to the third point, there is a 
major ‘policy drift’ after EP elections: EU policies do not reflect the wishes and preferences of 
the majority of the voters. The direct link between what people vote for, and what actually 
happens on a policy level is vague to say the least.  
Andrew Moravcsik (2004) counters these critical claims by, first, pointing to the 
power held by national governments: the majority of decisions are still taken by the Member 
States’ governments, and they are elected democratically. Second, the European Parliament 
has received significant increases in capabilities in the last decades. This has continued with 
the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty. In sum: ‘because the governments run the EU and 
there is ‘hard bargaining’ in the adoption of all EU policies, the EU is unlikely to adopt 
anything which negatively affects an important national interest or social group’ (Follesdal & 
Hix, 2006: 541). This observation does, however, strike upon a core reason of dissatisfaction 
with the EU: its inability to autonomously make effective decisions on important topics.  
 
2.2. Democracy in the European Union 
 
There are various philosophical conceptions of democracy the EU could aim developing 
towards. Andrew Moravcsik (2004) has chosen the following four from which the EU has 
been criticized the most: libertarian, pluralist, social democratic and deliberative democracy. 
He concludes that ‘though centralized electoral control and collective deliberation remain 
relatively weak and diffuse, constitutional and material restrictions on the EU’s mandate, 
inter-institutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, 
and the modest but increasing powers of the European Parliament are more than sufficient 
to assure that in most of what it does, EU policy-making is generally clean, transparent, 
effective and politically responsive to the demands of Europeans’ (Moravcsik, 2004: 338-
339). Even though the ‘effective’ part of this argument is disputed, it remains an interesting 
way of looking at democracy in an international context.  
This extent of the democratic deficit can be empirically analyzed by taking a look at 
the turnout figures for the elections for the European Parliament. Since elections for the 
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European Parliament were first held in 1979, the turnout for the elections has dropped 
significantly every time elections were held. The latest elections in 2009 formed the new low-
point with an abstention rate of 57% (European Parliament, 2009: 3). The European 
Parliament, in its survey on the outcomes of the elections, emphasizes that the continual 
increase in abstention is slowing down. However, some increase can be seen in the newer 
Member States – where the turnout is still very low – while in the member states which have 
been part of the EU since the initial vote in 1979, the turnout is still shrinking dramatically 
(European Parliament, 2009: 2-4). This drop, however, can partially be explained by a 
process of depoliticization (Mair, 2005; Mair, 2007).  
Even for those who opt the EU constitutes a new form of democracy, like Moravcsik, 
it is difficult to argue that the European Union currently operates without a democratic 
deficit. The idea of deliberative democracy requires widespread public awareness and public 
support for European integration. Although according to the European Committee (EC) 
support for the crisis measures are strong, the resistance within Member States and the 
emergence of anti-European sentiments in many EU countries demonstrates this support is 
not that widespread. Only 40% of EU citizens support the strategy to counter the crisis, 52% 
of Europeans are still positive towards the common currency, and the support for further 
integration is expected to be even lower (European Commission, 2012). The recent crises 
have only exacerbated the pre-existing anti-European sentiments. The large costs which 
accompany the strategy to get the European Union to emerge stronger out of the crisis are a 
major problem for most citizens. 
Whether or not there is an actual democratic deficit in the way the European Union 
functions is, as counterintuitive as it sounds, irrelevant. Citizens in national member states 
often blame the incumbent government when something goes wrong. They are, 
consequently, motivated to vote in order to support regime change. This is inherent to a 
democratic system. In the European Union, however, a downturn in any form alienates 
voters from the entire conception of the European Union. This is due to the fact that most 
citizens do not perceive a European government which they can oppose against. Therefore, 
they oppose to the entire system of the EU (Hix, 2008: 68-69). The perception of an 
undemocratic EU is enough to cause some form of democratic deficit.  
In time of crisis, citizens of a nation-state generally feel some form of national 
solidarity towards the weaker regions of a country and are often prepared to sacrifice their 
own interests for the common good (Buruma, 2011). This has turned out not to be the case 
in Europe: citizens of rich northern European countries are not willing to assist the south, 
even though it’s in the interest of the ‘common’ (European) good. Because of the low levels 
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of public support for spending further resources on solving the eurocrisis, the EU countries 
have chosen for austerity as a crisis strategy. Austerity has, according to many, only 
exacerbated the problems (Fischer, 2012). The ongoing crisis, in turn, has further decreased 
popular support; this has become the vicious circle of the eurocrisis. 
Besides this lack of a sense of solidarity, the democratic deficit can partially be 
explained by the indirect way citizens affect the European policy-making, and the relatively 
limited concrete ways in which Europe is perceived to influence most people’s daily lives 
(Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007: 4-6). Moreover, the electorate often takes what European 
integration has brought for granted: peace, convenience, stability and prosperity are 
important products of European integration. These issues should be highlighted by creating 
awareness about what Europe has brought. A directly elected leader, furthermore, might 
help improve legitimacy (Hix, 2011: 81). It adds to the democratic deficit, however, when 
large scale reform of European integration is made without popular support. This then 
contributes to the abovementioned vicious circle: European integration cannot continue 
because people do not support it, and people do not support it, because they do not fully 
understand it, and they do not grasp to what extent European policies shape all our lives. 
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3. Why We Want a More Democratic EU and How to Get There 
 
During the ongoing and multifaceted eurocrisis, euro skeptics have argued for the dissolution 
of the European Union and a return to national sovereignty based on the nation state. Since 
for various reasons – including the benefits of a large and diversified economy, a key role in 
the global balance of power, and various other economic, social and political benefits 
brought by the EU (Hix, 2008: 25) – the dissolution of the EU is not an option for most of its 
Member States, the multitude of challenges for European integration must be resolved. One 
of the most important of these challenges is the democratic deficit. Improving the quality of 
the EU’s democracy relies upon many factors; these factors will be explored in this section. 
The recurring core component of these factors is further European integration through 
transferring more decision-making power to the EU and instituting democratic reforms.  
 
3.1. Why More Democracy in the EU?  
 
One of the core notions of democracy is the contestation over political office. Even though 
this notion was purposely limited in the European Union model by its founding fathers 
because they saw national rivalries and ideological conflicts as the root causes of war and 
economic destruction, the current wish for democracy requires conflicting politics. When, 
however, the decision to establish a less democratic EU is viewed in its historical context, it 
makes complete sense: besides the obvious reasons of peace and stability, the EU was 
meant to set up basic guidelines and regulations that benefited all. Political competition over 
office would have inherently induced interest blocks, lobbying, and some of the less 
productive ‘side-effects’ of a democratic system. Democracy was not the main priority during 
the polity-building and market-creating stages of the European integration project (Hix, 
2008: 90-91). Combined with the consensual nature of the EU’s decision-making process, it 
has been extremely difficult to realize democratic change (Hix, 2008: 96). This technocratic 
model has, however, in our modern-day society, brought along the disconnect which is at 
the heart of the democratic deficit discussed here.  
Having a democratic EU has become more important in recent years because of the 
changing nature of issues the EU deals with. From regulating the internal market, setting up 
trading benefits and other policies for the common benefit, EU politics has developed a more 
political and conflicting side. These common-good policies have been complemented by 
political issues such as social and economic policies for the international market and the 
question of how the European economy must be reformed (Hix, 2008: 98). This last point 
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gained incredible importance with the current eurocrisis. Moreover, policy debates such as 
liberalization versus regulation of the internal market, carbon emissions and other 
environmental policies, immigration policies, and economic models (to name a few), have 
placed citizens, interest groups, political parties and government on opposite sides of various 
policy debates (Hix, 2008: 99).  
This trend of increased politicization of EU policies calls for more  democratic policy-
making in the EU to ensure that the institution will go into the direction its citizens want it to 
go. Political conflict is inescapable in this evolving policy-environment; the EU must engage 
its citizens by giving them a direct vote for political office. Ensuring the important policy 
dilemma’s are the centre of any election is necessary to accomplish this.  
Schuck et al. (2011: 43) find that political contestation would increase the salience of 
elections. Without political contestation, and the personalization of political debate and 
decisions, the European Union remains a faceless institution in which the political 
accountability remains invisible (Schuck et al., 2011: 43). Visibility of elections would also be 
increased by contestation because: ‘news media tend to focus on stories where there is 
conflict – where two sides can be pitted against one another’ (Schuck et al., 2011: 43). By 
increasing the salience and visibility of European elections, this step would further 
democratize the EU by narrowing the gap between the EU and its citizens.  
 Legitimacy, furthermore, is a key concept in this discussion. With all the speculation 
of the EU’s democratic deficit, put together with the fact that the most powerful EU leaders 
are appointed, creates a problem of input legitimacy. This (perception of) a lack of 
legitimacy, in combination with the consensual European policy-making process, make 
controversial reform near to impossible. As a consequence, some political or controversial, 
but necessary decisions are not being made by the EU, simply because it does not have the 
legitimacy to make these difficult decisions. More voter input in the European system would 
address this problem by legitimizing European leaders to make tough but necessary 
decisions in order to keep the EU from staying a static and old-fashioned institution 
(DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann, 2007).  
 
3.2. How to Facilitate EU Democratization 
 
An interesting theory on why the European Union has since long lacked democratic 
legitimacy is provided by Dani Rodrik’s political trilemma of the world economy (see Figure 1) 
(Rodrik, 2000: 181). This trilemma states that there can only be two of the following policy 
goals simultaneously: (a) integration of national economies, (b) nation states, and (c) mass 
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politics (Rodrik, 2000: 180-182). For the example of European integration, Rodrik poses that 
(a) can be seen as further European integration, (b) as national sovereignty, and (c) as 
democratic legitimacy. The presence of (a) and (b) Rodrik calls the Golden Straightjacket, 
(b) and (c) constitute the Bretton Woods compromise, and (a) and (c) equals global 
federalism (Rodrik, 2000: 181). History has proven that the simultaneous existence of all 
three is impossible. The Golden Straightjacket can push for economic integration without 
democracy, and the Bretton Woods paradigm does not allow for deep economic integration. 
Democratic economic integration is only possible when a step is made away from national 
sovereignty; this move would start to resemble global federalism (Rodrik, 2000: 184). The 
European Union has reached the limit in how all three can be combined, and has lately seen 
a decrease in democratic legitimacy. When democracy  is highly valued and integrations is 
inescapable, the only option is to move away from national sovereignty.  
 
Figure 1. Rodrik’s Political Trilemma of the World  Economy (Rodrik, 2000: 181). 
 
 
 
Golden Straightjacket            Global Federalism 
 
 
Bretton Woods Compromise 
 
 
According to this trilemma, the realization of economic integration in a democratically 
legitimate way requires sacrifices on national sovereignty (Rodrik, 2000: 183). The only way, 
therefore, the European Union can even start to gain true democratic legitimacy is by further 
integration towards a fiscal or political union. This new system would more reflect the U.S. 
federal system, according to Rodrik. In this way, sovereignty is transferred from the national 
level to the European level, creating an opportunity for democratic legitimacy to further 
A: Integrated National 
Economies 
C: Mass Politics B: Nation State 
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develop. ‘National governments would not necessarily disappear, but their powers would be 
severely circumscribed by supranational legislative, executive, and judicial authorities’ 
(Rodrik, 2000: 182). 
 The shape this further integration should take is – in line with many core issues of EU 
studies – subject to widespread debate. Amidst this severe crisis, talk of radical acceleration 
of integration is not in order. However, the major reason why careful further integration 
could lead to a more democratic system deals with the engagement of citizens in the political 
process. Further integration, paradoxically, even though it might be in contrast with the 
current popular demands, would resolve many of the abovementioned factors contributing to 
the existing deficit. If European politics would become center-stage and EU decisions, 
instead of national decisions, would have the most direct impact on people’s lives, the 
problems of ‘second order elections’, the disconnect, policy drift, and the lack of input 
legitimacy within the EU would – at least partially - resolve themselves (Follesdal & Hix, 
2006). It would, furthermore, also be likely that direct competition for the highest offices 
would be established. In sum, European politics as primary politics for EU citizens would 
contribute to further democratizing the EU.  
 As Simon Hix argues in his well-known work ‘What’s Wrong with the European Union 
and How to Fix it’ (2008), further integration is likely to lead to a better functioning European 
Union. Both in breadth as well as depth there are opportunities for improvements. Hix 
recommends broader integration in the service sector to maximize opportunities in the 
fastest growing economies, as well as the energy market, where energy dependency on non-
EU states should be decreased (Hix, 2008: 27). There are also more opportunities to develop 
integration on security and foreign policy. In depth, Hix suggests to inject more political 
competition into EU political processes. Creating a federal union – the notion of a United 
States of Europe – goes substantially too far, but further integration developing ‘limited 
democratic politics’ is a core stop towards fixing the EU’s democratic deficit (Hix, 2008: 86). 
 To facilitate democratic reform in a complex, bureaucratic and consensual institution 
as the EU, the institution requires various changes. Firstly, as Hix points out, EU politics must 
be based on political contestation, since: ‘a contest for control of political authority and over 
the direction of the policy agenda forces the elites to reveal their policy agenda for the public 
and encourages leaders to engage in policy innovations and joined-up thinking across a 
range of policy issues’ (Hix, 2008: 90). Such a contest would ensure that politicians ‘think 
outside the box’ and stay on their toes in order to remain in the public’s good graces. 
Moreover, when under political contestation, politicians are under more substantial media 
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scrutiny and general pressure to perform. With the potential of competing politicians offering 
alternative agendas, Europe’s leaders are more likely to stay innovative (Hix, 2008: 99).   
4. Methodological Framework 
 
The methodological foundation of this research - after the establishment of the research 
question, core hypotheses, conceptualization and operationalization - consists of two 
connected sections. First, the various dimensions of the democratic deficit will be evaluated 
in light of the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty. This will consist of a ‘before-and-after’ 
comparison of the three dimensions of democratic deficit as conceptualized below. An 
analysis of these dimensions will allow us to assess the improvements that have been made 
and the fields in which further development is required. The second part of the analysis 
consists of a idiographic counterfactual analysis of how further integration would have 
affected the various dimensions of the democratic deficit. The main argument in this section 
is that a path of slowly further integrating and democratizing the EU is the best remedy for 
the democratic deficit. In the discussion section, the main findings of the analysis and its 
implications will be discussed.   
 
4.1. Research Question and Hypotheses 
 
The considerations above generate many questions about the role of democracy within the 
EU and the possibilities for improvement within the reach of a European framework. Even 
though much is still under severe debate, there is consensus that democracy in Europe is 
flawed. With every new treaty attempts are made to improve the functioning of the EU. 
Although this has been proven tremendously difficult, the Lisbon Treaty has made some 
important changes to the institutional set-up of the Union. But how exactly have the changes 
made by the Lisbon Treaty affected the democratization of the European Union?  
 Even though some improvements have been observed, the democratic value of the 
EU is still imperfect. There is much debate regarding the democratic possibilities for the EU: 
to what extent can a unique institution as the EU conform to pre-existing considerations of 
democracy? How can, within the framework of the EU, the abovementioned claims about the 
democratic deficit be resolved most effectively?   
 These two essential themes of the study of the European Union have led me to adopt 
the following research question: ‘How has the Lisbon Treaty affected the various dimensions 
of the democratic deficit within the European Union, and how can this deficit be resolved 
effectively?’ Stemming from the theoretical framework above, expectation would suggest 
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that further integration would have led to a decrease in the democratic deficit in the 
European Union. The core methodological aim of this thesis is to test the empirical and 
theoretical validity of this assumption.  
 The expectation is that the Lisbon Treaty has positively altered the democratic value  
of the inter-institutional balance of power and the democratic functioning of the EU by 
strengthening the European Parliament at the expense of the European Commission. 
However, it does realize the limited effect the watered-down constitutional treaty might have 
had on the disconnect and public trust. Even though democratic measures, such as the 
citizens initiatives, were meant as a building block for the creation of the European public 
sphere, more far-reaching steps are necessary to substantially influence these deficits. 
Because of the increased importance of the EP, the disconnect between the citizens and the 
EU is expected to have decreased marginally. Trust and identity, thirdly, are expected not to 
have been affected, especially in light of the effects of the eurocrisis. These general 
expectations will now be translated into testable hypotheses.  
 
The core hypotheses for this research, therefore, would predict that:  
- (1) the Lisbon Treaty has had a modestly positive effect on the democratic workings 
of the European Union (first dimension),  
- (2) the Lisbon Treaty has made EU citizens slightly more engaged with European 
Parliament elections because of its growing role and importance (second dimension),  
- (3) the Lisbon Treaty has not had a positive effect on trust in the EU and European 
identity (third dimension), 
- (4) a more substantive step in European integration would have a positive effect on 
decreasing the democratic deficit (counterfactual analysis).  
 
In the conceptualization the specific dimensions of the democratic deficit will be 
further explained. The operationalization, moreover, will explain how the four hypotheses will 
be theoretically tested on the basis of institutional changes made by the Lisbon Treaty, as 
well as empirically tested through a comparison of European Parliament election news 
coverage in 2004 and 2009, and levels of trust in, support for, and citizenship of the EU 
through Eurobarometer statistics.  
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4.2. Conceptualization: the Dimensions of the Democratic Deficit 
 
In order to test the extent of democratization in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, the 
performance will be tested by means of dimensions of the democratic deficit. Follesdal and 
Hix (2006: 536) identify the abovementioned five core claims about the democratic deficit in 
the EU: (1) increase in executive power vis-à-vis national parliamentary control, (2) the 
European Parliament (EP) is too weak, (3) there are no ‘European’ elections, (4) the EU is 
institutionally and psychologically too distant from the voters, and (5) European integration 
produces policy drift from voters’ preferences (Follesdal & Hix, 2006: 535).   
 It is possible to derive three different dimensions of the democratic deficit from these 
general claims about its nature. First, factors 1 and 2 are linked with the EU’s inter-
institutional balance of power and the institutions’ democratic functioning. This is 
the first dimension in this analysis, and deals with the institutional functioning of the Union. 
The second dimension consists of considerations from claim 3 and 5: the fact that national 
elections do not deal with European issues, and European elections often turn out to be 
‘second-order national contests’ (Reif & Schmitt, 1980), a policy drift develops between 
voters preferences expressed in the voting booth, and action taken on a European level. 
This disconnect is the second dimension of the deficit. Lastly, claim 4 refers to the 
problems of the lack of a European identity and citizenship, and general lack of support for 
and trust in the EU. This public opinion problem is the third and final dimension of the 
democratic deficit in this research.  
 
4.3. Operationalization 
 
To measure, first, the effect the changes of the Lisbon Treaty have had on the democratic 
deficit, all three dimensions will be measured on the basis of changes made by the Lisbon 
Treaty to test the hypotheses. Here, the elections from 2004 and 2009 will be the main point 
of comparison for turnout and news coverage. For symmetry reasons, measurements of trust 
and identity will also be taken from these intervals. The first dimension of the deficit, the 
democratic functioning of the EU institutions, is easily measured: the number of capabilities 
and responsibilities obtained by each institution creates the amount of influence these 
institutions have. An analysis of changes made to the capabilities of these institutions, 
coupled with the simple premise that some institutions are democratic and others are not, 
will demonstrate the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty.  
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 The second dimension, the disconnect between elections and policy issues on the 
European level, is more complex to operationalize. To measure which issues are of primary 
importance for certain elections, news coverage of the European elections in all Member 
States will be analyzed. An analysis of the visibility, tone, and core actors and issues in the 
25 Member States (circa 2004) before and after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty (again 
2004 and 2009) will illustrate any possible shift made. De Vreese et al. (2006) and Schuck et 
al. (2011) have researched news coverage of the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament 
elections in the 25 – and 27 in 2009 - EU members. Both findings will be extensively 
compared on the basis of the saliency of the EP elections.  
 Thirdly, the dimension dealing with the European public opinion deficit – feelings of 
European identity and citizenship, trust in the European Union, and support for further 
integration - can be operationalized by analyzing Eurobarometer data from before and after 
the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty. Turnout rates, levels of trust and support, and 
measurements of European identity and citizenship, compared between 2004 and 2009 – 
with an additional point of measurement more recently in 2012 because public opinion does 
not change overnight -  can determine the possible effect the Lisbon Treaty has had. The 
question ‘Generally speaking, do you think (your country’s) membership of the European 
Community/Union is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad, or don’t know?’, which 
has been used in every Eurobarometer since its establishment, will be used to compare 
support for the EU (Eurobarometer, 2004, 2009 and 2012). More specific questions 
regarding trust, identity and citizenship will also be compared. In this analysis, the so-called 
‘fair-weather phenomenon’ must be taken into account: when the EU is doing well 
economically, support is high, but as soon as there are difficulties, support drops (Hix, 2008: 
52). The current economic crisis can therefore be an important intervening variable in this 
analysis.  
 With regard to the fourth hypothesis, that a more substantive step forward in 
European integration and democratization would have (had) a positive effect on democracy 
in the EU, a counterfactual analysis will be made. To determine how further integration 
would have affected the different dimensions of deficit, a theoretical analysis of the possible 
effects will be hypothesized. In relation to all three dimensions, as will be argued in the 
thesis, deeper and more democratic integration would positively affect the democratic deficit.  
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5. Core Analysis: Lisbon and the Democratic Deficit 
 
In this section, the core analysis regarding the extent of the abovementioned dimensions of 
the democratic deficit will be made. By making a comparison on the indicated measurements 
of the three dimensions, a picture will be painted of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty. First, a 
theoretical comparison regarding the first dimension – the EU’s institutions and their 
democratic functioning – is expected to show the most significant impact. Moreover, an 
empirical analysis regarding the news coverage of the 2004 and 2009 European 
parliamentary elections will uncover any change in national perception of the EU, and the 
disconnect which is often discussed. Lastly, a comparison of Eurobarometer data of 2004, 
2009 and 2012 will determine how European identity and trust in the EU have been affected 
in recent years.  
 
5.1. Dimension 1: The EU’s Institutions and their Democratic Functioning 
 
The Lisbon Treaty has made substantial changes in the capabilities held by the different EU 
institutions. One of the most important goals of the Lisbon Treaty was to address the 
growing consensus that the European Union was facing a democratic deficit. Various policies 
have been implemented to ensure a more democratic functioning of the Union. Most notably, 
the Lisbon Treaty includes specific provisions on democratic principles in its Title 2 (Mayoral, 
2011). Article 10 of the current Treaty on the European Union (TEU) holds most of the 
provisions on improving the democratic standing of the institution. The most extensive 
changes made by the treaty, in short, were that European Citizens’ Initiatives (ECIs) were 
introduced, democracy became even more central in the EU philosophy, and the most 
democratic EU institution - the European Parliament - was given further competencies 
(Mayoral, 2011). This section will first give a comprehensive overview of all the relevant 
changes made by the treaty, after which the implications for the various institutions will be 
analyzed. After giving a short overview of the main changes made by Lisbon, the most 
important changes will be elaborated upon in more detail. The mechanisms which influence 
the democratic functioning of the EU will then also be analyzed. In conclusion, the effect 
these changes have had on (1) the inter-institutional balance of power, and (2) the 
democratic functioning of the EU institutions will be outlined. These two are related but not 
identical. The balance of power partially talks about democracy, but also about other 
capabilities; the democratic functioning is to a large degree based on the capabilities of the 
institutions, but goes beyond that.  
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5.1.1. Major Changes Made by Lisbon 
 
First and foremost, one of the most important changes made by the Lisbon Treaty vis-à-vis 
the institutions is the increase of capabilities of the European Parliament at the expense of 
the European Commission (Monar, 2011: 14). The European Council’s capabilities, moreover, 
have also grown substantially: the EC gained decision-making capabilities as opposed to 
advisory and deliberative powers. These increases in capabilities has caused a marginal 
decrease of powers held by the Council of Ministers. A four-polar balance of power has been 
established within the European Union’s institutional framework with the official recognition 
of the European Council’s as EU institution (Monar, 2011: 3).  
What has changed regarding democratization with the Lisbon Treaty? The treaty 
aimed at closing the gap between the citizens and the institutions by increasing the 
participation of Europeans, and the influence they can exert on the policy making (Mayoral, 
2011). More structurally, the treaty actively focused on three principles of democratic 
governance in the European Union: (1) democratic equality, (2) representative democracy, 
and (3) participatory democracy (European Union, 2013). The first principle simply entails 
that all institutions must give equal attention to all citizens, therewith countering regional or 
social-economic exclusion. Representative democracy, secondly, is strengthened by the 
abovementioned increase in capabilities held by the European Parliament. The third principle 
was operationalized by the citizens’ initiatives and other measures to narrow the gap 
between Europe and its inhabitants. One of the most important inclusive measures, a directly 
elected leadership – as we will see -  is still lacking. 
 
5.1.2. Representation: The European and National Parliaments  
 
The increase of the EP’s capabilities is one of the – if not the – most important development 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Every major treaty has strengthened the EP in some regard, but 
Lisbon’s changes are extensive. The changes made can be categorized in three fields: 
legislative, budgetary, and regarding international agreements (European Union, 2013). 
These changes make that the European Parliament gained influence over a wide variety of 
policy fields, both internal and external. Moreover, the EP can make budgetary demands and 
has a role to play in generally all lawmaking (Mayoral, 2011).   
The parliament’s legislative capabilities, first, have been increased with the extension 
of the co-decision procedure – and its name-change to the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ 
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(Treaty of Lisbon, 2007: Art 14.1). Where the co-decision procedure, which has been used 
and extended in order to increase the EP’s influence, was limited to fewer policy fields, the 
newly formed ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ expands these competencies to areas such as 
legal immigration, alignment of prison standards, trade and agriculture, and police 
cooperation (Mayoral, 2011: 4). This procedure, as well as Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is 
more widely applied by the Council, increasing the capabilities of the EP to exert its 
influence. Regarding the third point of the EP’s increase in capabilities: the parliament’s 
permission is now required on any international agreements made in the policy fields falling 
under the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (TEU, 2007). This also includes the obligation of 
the Council to consult the EP on matters regarding the functioning of the European External 
Action Service (TEU, 2007: Art 27.3).  
On budgetary matters, the European Parliament is now on equal footing with the 
Council in determining and approving the European budget. The pre-existing practice of a 
multiannual financial framework is confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty. This framework requires 
the EP’s approval, which adds to its growing capabilities. On top of this, the distinction 
between ‘compulsory’ and ‘non-compulsory’ expenditure is abolished, giving the EP 
jurisdiction to approve all budgetary expenditure (TEU, 2007: Art 16.1).  
Moreover, the EP now has the authority to establish temporary committees of inquiry, 
and it can vote on a motion of censure about the resignation of the Commission (which is 
responsible to the EP) (Mayoral, 2011: 3). More symbolically, the Lisbon Treaty redefines 
what a Member of Parliament (MEP) is from ‘representatives of the peoples of the States 
brought together in the Community’ to ‘representatives of the Union’s citizens’ (Mayoral, 
2011: 3; Lisbon Treaty, 2007: Art. 14.2).   
The Lisbon Treaty also assisted the EP in its jurisdiction squabbles with the 
Commission and the Council on the comitology process (Mayoral, 2011: 4). Even more 
technical, the EP must now be consulted by the Council regarding legal acts on the basis of 
the ‘flexibility clause’. It also has the ability to submit proposals to the Council regarding the 
amendment of the treaties, and it needs to give consent in the eventuality of a withdrawal 
request by one of the Member States (Mayoral, 2011: 5).  
National parliaments, moreover, also have been given an increased role by the Treaty 
of Lisbon. A new clause is added to the TEU  expressing the desire to ‘encourage greater 
involvement of national Parliaments in the activities of the European Union and to enhance 
their ability to express their views on draft legislative acts of the European Union as well as 
on other matters which may be of particular interest to them’ (TEU, 2007: Art 7). The fields 
in which the national parliaments are more encouraged to participate in the EU policy 
20 
 
process are the evaluation of policies in fields such as security and freedom, their right to 
information, and most interestingly the power to endorse subsidiarity (TEU, 2007).  
Subsidiarity deals with the scope of issues the European Union deals with. Whenever 
the EU has exclusive powers, it will deal with issues on the European level. Whenever 
powers or competencies are shared, the EU will only take action when this would be more 
effective on the European level than on the national level. When national parliaments feel 
that this principle is not abided by, they can initiate a two-stage procedure: (1) when over 
33% of national parliaments objects to a proposal, on the basis is does not comply with 
subsidiarity, the Commission is required to re-evaluate the proposal (yellow card), and (2) 
when over 50% of national parliaments object (orange card), and the Commission does not 
change its proposal, the EP and Council are tasked to decide on the issue (Treaty of Lisbon, 
2007).  
As can be concluded from the abovementioned discussion of the changes made to 
the capabilities of the European Parliament and the national parliaments, the Treaty of 
Lisbon has enabled more power for directly elected institutions. The increased powers given 
to the European Parliament are generally regarded as extensive. This, ergo, constitutes an 
improvement of the democratic functioning of the EU policy-making process.  
 
5.1.3. Participation: the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) and Beyond 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon aimed not only to increase the representative democracy in the EU, but 
also the participation of its citizens in the decision-making process. The European Citizens’ 
Initiative (ECI) is one of the most important attempts made by the Lisbon Treaty to try and 
improve the participation of citizens and close the growing disconnect between the 
institution and its subjects. Article 11.4 of the current TEU gives some insight into the 
workings of the ECI: ‘not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant 
number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, 
within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where 
citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the 
Treaties’ (TEU, 2007: Art. 11.4). The ECI puts citizens on an equal footing with the European 
Parliament and the Council by giving them the right to request the Commission for legislative 
action.  
 There are quite a number of strict bureaucratic requirements in order to successfully 
qualify for an ECI: one million signatories are required from at least 25% of the EU Member 
States (seven countries minimum), a citizens’ committee of at least seven citizens from 
21 
 
seven different countries must initiate and submit the ECI, and the signatures must accede 
the minimum requirement per member state (number of MEPs times 750) (Mayoral, 2011: 
6). When these demands have been met, the Commission must decide whether or not to 
take action on the basis of the ECI, and give its answer to the organizers, the EP and the 
Council. The organizers of the ECI have the right to hold a public hearing organized by the 
Commission and EP, in which they can present their ECI (Mayoral, 2011).  
 The ECI was first officially implemented on Europe Day (May 9) 2012 with the 
adoption of the first ECI, Fraternité 2020 (Fraternité 2020, 2012). This initiative was set up 
to encourage cultural exchanges such as the Erasmus Program and the European Voluntary 
Service (EVS). Since this initial ECI, around nine initiatives have been completed (European 
Commission, 2013). An ongoing Dutch citizens’ initiative – with the intention of developing to 
an ECI -  is demonstrating the degree of the democratic deficit by calling for an immediate 
halt of any form of new competencies for the EU without a national referendum 
(Burgerforum EU, 2013). Over 55.000 signatures have been collected in support of this 
initiative, which is almost three times the national threshold.  
 Besides the ECI, the Lisbon Treaty has implemented other policies in order to more 
fully engage European civil society and citizens in the decision-making process. The Lisbon 
Treaty emphasizes the importance of cooperation with the variety of representative civil 
society organizations and adequately informing them. The main aim is to ensure that the 
EU’s actions are coherent and transparent (TEU, Art. 11). Moreover, the Treaty promotes 
open dialogue and public debate between the EU institutions and civil society (TFEU, 15-16),  
 Besides all these amendments, the Lisbon Treaty set further specific objectives for 
the individual institutions. They specifically focus on the manners in which the institutions 
will inform and engage the public in its decision-making process and strive for transparency. 
An increasing amount of documents are made public for all citizens, and citizens are allowed 
to petition (Mayoral, 2011). Even though the effectiveness of all these measures has yet to 
be fully measured in practice, in theory there have been a number of positive steps towards 
engaging citizens in the European decision-making process.  
  
5.1.4. Implications for Democracy in Europe 
 
So what do these changes practically mean for the first dimension of the democratic deficit? 
The consensus dictates that although Lisbon is a step in the right direction, the changes do 
not address some core issues of the deficit. These issues predominantly encompass the 
election of European leaders and executive officials (Commissioners).  
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 Engaging the European citizens in the policy-making process without giving them a 
direct vote to elect their leaders can be a dangerous thing. As can be seen from the anti-
European initiative initiated in the Netherlands, this kind of half-measures can give people 
who feel alienated from the process the opportunity to sabotage European integration. 
However, because the Lisbon Treaty has made the European Parliament substantially more 
powerful and important in the EU’s institutional balance of power, the expectation is that EU 
citizens should be more inclined to engage with and vote for the EP elections.  
 
5.2. Dimension 2: the Disconnect between the National and European Level 
 
This inclination to engage with EP elections is what this next section will address. The core 
focus is to determine how preferences, policy ideas and issues that concern European 
citizens are reflected in the European policy. The two core claims about the democratic 
deficit – the disconnect between voters and the EU, and the ‘policy drift’ after elections – 
have been operationalized by the measurement of news coverage during European 
parliamentary elections. News coverage is a relevant proxy for the second dimension of the 
democratic deficit, because both the policy drift – national issues in European elections – and 
the ‘second-rate national contest’-phenomenon – persistence of national issues plus the lack 
of visibility – are measured by the news coverage analysis.  
First the news coverage of the 2004 European parliamentary elections will be 
analyzed in the basis of a content analysis encompassing the then 25 Member States and the 
coverage of the EP elections in both print-media and on television (De Vreese et al., 2006a). 
A similar research was done into the salience of the 2009 EP elections through a content 
analysis of news coverage in 27 Member States, also in newspapers and on television 
(Schuck et al., 2011). The visibility of the elections in the news coverage, the issues that are 
portrayed in that coverage, the tone of the coverage, and the actors which are discussed 
form the main points of analysis for both elections and can easily be compared. The findings 
of news coverage in both elections, based on a comparative analysis of these works, 
including additional findings by Banducci et al. (2004), Kovar & Kovar (2012), and De Vreese 
et al. (2006b), will thereafter deduce any possible changes before and after the Lisbon 
Treaty went into force.  
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5.2.1. News Coverage in the 2004 EP Elections 
 
During the 2004 election campaign for the European Parliament the news coverage of the 
EU and its elections were analyzed by De Vreese et al. (2006). Regarding the visibility of the 
EP elections in the news coverage, there is quite some variation between different Member 
States. Overall 9.8% of the total news coverage on TV and in the newspapers in the three 
weeks leading up to the election regarded the EU or the EP elections specifically. Between 
countries, however, this number varied from around 3% in Germany to 21% in Greece (see 
Figure 2) (De Vreese et al., 2006: 487-488). These figures show a quite substantial increase 
from the previous elections in 1999, when only 6.6% of news coverage dealt with the EU 
and its elections (De Vreese et al., 2006: 488). This increase, however, can be largely 
explained by the additional of the ten new Member States, in which the attention for their 
first elections as EU Member States, naturally, was quite high.  
  
Figure 2: TV News Coverage in 2004 EP Elections (De Vreese et al., 2006: 488)  
 
 
The choice is made here to compare the news coverage of the EP elections on 
television news. The figures for print media are similar, but vary largely between countries. 
Developments with print-media, including the decreasing numbers of readers, as well as the 
fact that 79.5% of the EU news was on television, make TV news a better indicator of 
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visibility. An expected but convincing variation, furthermore, is found in comparing news 
coverage between commercial and public networks: public networks put substantially more 
emphasis on elections as compared to their commercial counterparts (De Vreese et al., 
2006: 489).  
The second unit of analysis reflect on the actors portrayed in the EU news coverage. 
The main question here is whether or not the national political parties or the European 
actors take center-stage during the campaign. In 2004, continuing the trend of 1999, the 
domestic political actors dominate the coverage of the EP elections. The dominance of 
national actors did slightly decrease compared to 1999 (De Vreese et al., 2006: 491). This is 
an indication that the second-rate national election phenomenon discussed above is still 
salient in EP elections. In total, over 50% of the main actors portrayed in EP news coverage 
were national actors, around 25% were EU level actors. The Netherlands was the only 
country where more focus was put on EU level actors than on national actors (De Vreese et 
al., 2006: 492). More EU representatives were present in those countries which had EP 
elections for the first or second time, so a further decrease in EU level visibility can be 
expected  for later elections.  
The prevalence of national actors in news coverage already indicates that the 
majority of the issues discussed on the news were national. In 2004, the recent EU 
enlargement was one of the core European issues, but the most attention was given to the 
national political parties, and their issues (Kovar & Kovar, 2012; De Vreese et al., 2006a). 
The fact that opposition parties generally perform better in EP elections than incumbent 
parties is testament to this. When issues are European, moreover, they regularly encompass 
a general anti-European attitude. Whether or not this makes for a European issues, however, 
is debatable.  
Regarding the tone of EP coverage in the different Member States, a surprising 
percentage of coverage employed a neutral tone (84%). Of the remaining 16%, a scale 
ranging from -1 (consistently negative evaluations) to +1 (consistently positive evaluations) 
demonstrates that the coverage was marginally negative (-0.03) (De Vreese et al., 2006: 
493). The tone of coverage ranges from positive in Cyprus (+0.10) and Malta (+0.11) to 
negative in countries such as Greece and Portugal (-0.20), the UK (-0.18) and the 
Netherlands (-0.17). A significant variation became apparent between the old and the new 
Member States: in the new member states, news coverage was substantially more positive 
(De Vreese et al., 2006: 493).  
News coverage of the 2004 EP elections, even though they were more visible and 
centered more EU actors than in 1999, remain mostly focused on national actors and issues. 
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The visibility of the elections significantly increased. This is in line with expectations 
surrounding the increased importance of the European Parliament. If this notion holds true, 
we should be able to extend this trend to the 2009 EP elections in which the EP gained even 
further importance due to the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
5.2.2. News Coverage in the 2009 EP Elections 
 
Compared to 2004, the EP elections in 2009 indeed showed substantially more visibility both 
in newspapers as well as on television. In the three weeks leading up to the elections in 
2009, over the spectrum of all 27 Member States, 20.16% of all TV news coverage was 
dealing with the EU or even with the EP elections specifically; for print media this figure was 
slightly lower. Between the Member States, this coverage varied from a minimum of 8.47% 
in Wallonia, the French-speaking part of Belgium, to up to 57.09% in Greece (see Figure 3) 
(Schuck, 2011: 46). Only in Denmark, Slovakia and Lithuania visibility decreased as 
compared to 2004. Variation in visibility has been country-specific, and there has been no 
clear East-West or North-South divide (Schuck et al., 2011: 47). This not only supports a 
positive effect by the Lisbon Treaty regarding the visibility of the EU, but also substantiates 
the notion that direct influence of EU policies on the citizens’ lives – as is most clearly the 
case in Greece – leads to more engagement in the society.  
 
Figure 3: TV News Coverage in 2009 EP Elections (Schuck et al., 2011: 46)  
 
 
The actors that were portrayed in the news coverage of the European elections in 
2009 were still mostly national like in 2004. However, there have been increases in the 
discussion of EU level actors in the coverage as well. In contrast to one country in 2004, ten 
countries in 2009 demonstrate more attention to EU level actors than to national actors 
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(Schuck et al., 2011: 48). In general, however, the presence of EU level actors in the news 
coverage on the EP elections is still lower than can be expected. The phenomenon of 
second-rate national elections, therefore, even though there is a slight decline, is still 
prevalent.  
In Lithuania, the presence of EU level actors – with 55% - is the highest (Schuck et 
al., 2011: 48). This high number can be attributed to the fact that many prominent 
Lithuanian politicians were candidates for the EP. This, therefore, should signify the 
importance of well-known national politicians choosing the European Union for their political 
careers (something which is currently very uncommon). A possible increase in high-level 
politicians – such as possibly Nicolas Sarkozy - choosing to take on the European cause, 
would strongly support the visibility of and connectedness with the EU.  
Regarding the issues that are discussed during the news coverage, the predominant 
focus – much like in 2004 – is still on national issues. However, there has been a significant 
increase of European issues on the agenda. This is, however, mostly attributable to the 
concern about the European economy, which is the most notable European issue (Schuck et 
al., 2011: 48). Besides the European economy (15.6% of the total coverage), issues such as 
EU external relations (7.8%), EU enlargement with Turkey (5.2%), and the EU’s political 
system (5.1%) were quite often portrayed in news coverage (Schuck et al., 2011: 47).  
 
5.2.3. Developments since the Lisbon Treaty 
 
The increase in the visibility of the EP elections since 2004 is unmistakable: TV coverage 
increased from 9.8% in 2004 to 20.16% in 2009 (De Vreese et al., 2006; Schuck et al., 
2011). Unlike the smaller increase made between 1999 and 2004, this increase cannot be 
explained by the introduction of new Member States (Bulgaria and Romania both scored 
below average). This, therefore, indicates a clear increase in attention for the EP elections 
after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. The start of the economic crisis, and the effects 
this had on the EU, has probably attributed to this surge in attention, but this is unlikely to 
explain the entire variation.  
In total, a significant increase in saliency of EP elections has been perceived. The 
number of news items regarding the EP elections rose dramatically, the actors portrayed in 
this coverage are increasingly EU level, and the issues are also more European than before. 
These findings, even though they cannot be directly attributed to the Lisbon Treaty, would 
support the hypothesis that through the increase of the importance of the European 
Parliament, the EU citizens feel slightly more engaged with the EU politics.  
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However, the fact that national issues and actors remain dominant in the coverage of 
European elections, in combination with still decreasing turnout rates, demonstrates that 
there is still a disconnect. European politics are still subordinate to national actors and issues. 
National political parties are judged in these elections in terms of their performance on the 
national levels. But what can be done about this? As discussed above, familiar faces from 
national politics on the European stage would increase the connectivity citizens feel towards 
the EP. The salience of EP elections in Greece is testament to this.  
The issue of contestation, both between parties for the EP and between individuals 
for possible contested EU leadership, would increase the salience of the EP elections 
dramatically (Schuck et al., 2011: 50). Even though parties at first might try to keep these 
issues of contestation out of the media, when contestation surpasses a certain point, an 
increase in salience – and therewith a decrease in the disconnect – will be unavoidable 
(Schuck et al., 2011: 50). Prominent European politicians should start feeling a sense of 
obligation to apply their potential in order to improve the European Union.  
 
5.3. Dimension 3: The Public Opinion Problem 
 
The third dimension of the democratic deficit as defined in this analysis deals with issues of 
public opinion: trust in the European institutions, support for further integration, and the 
levels of European identity and citizenship. An initial comparison between these values in 
2004 and 2009 will be made in order to indicate the variation between the two points of 
measurement. Trust and expectations for the are researched in the biannual standard 
Eurobarometer report. For measuring identity and citizenship some other research will also 
be applied. An overview of these main figures will indicate to what extent public opinion vis-
à-vis the EU has changed with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. To follow the 
trend to a more recent stage, the Eurobarometer measures from the Fall of 2012 will also be 
incorporated into the analysis.  
 
5.3.1. Trust in and Support for the EU 
 
The Fall 2004 Eurobarometer measured the amount of trust European citizens had in the 
Union on the basis of trust in various institutions. At the point of measurement in June 2004, 
52% of citizens had trust in the European Commission and 57% in the European Parliament 
(Eurobarometer 62, 2004). These figures both constituted increases in trust from the 
previous measurement (an increase of 4 and 3 points respectively). Among the Member 
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States there is significant variation regarding trust: the spectrum goes from the United 
Kingdom (less than 40% trust in both institutions) to Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg with 
level of trust far exceeding the Union’s average (Eurobarometer 62,2004).  
In 2009 the EU already faced some economic hardship. The question arose whether  
trust in the European institutions would decrease in light of the economic turmoil, or whether 
the crisis would unite Europeans behind the institutions. Even though both trust in the 
European Commission and the European Parliament rose from the previous year, there is a 
notable decrease in trust from our starting point in 2004. In 2009 50% of the Union’s 
citizens had trust in the EP, while only 46% trusted the Commission (Eurobarometer 72, 
2009). The explanation that this decrease is attributable to the economic crisis is more 
plausible than that the Lisbon Treaty was responsible: the low-point of trust in the European 
institutions was in 2008, at the start of the global financial crisis (Eurobarometer 72, 2009).  
The country with the highest trust in the European Parliament in 2009 was Slovakia 
(71%), which is surprising because the country had the lowest turnout rate in the EP 
elections that same year (Eurobarometer 72, 2009). This demonstrates that trust and 
engagement does not necessarily equal high turnout for elections. Support in the United 
Kingdom dropped even further to 25% in the EP and 21% trust in the Commission. In the 
Czech Republic, Luxembourg and Portugal trust in the EP increased substantially 
(Eurobarometer 72, 2009).  
 In 2012 these trends have strongly accelerated: since the abovementioned 
Eurobarometer 72 in 2009, trust in the European Union has almost continually declined. In 
2012 only 33% of EU citizens exclaim their trust in the Union’s institutions. In the most 
recent poll in the Fall of 2012, the first (small) increase in trust can be observed 
(Eurobarometer 78, 2012). Figure 4 shows how the perception of the European Union by its 
citizens has been negatively affected in recent years. This trend is worrying, but has been, in 
light of the ongoing concerns regarding the eurocrisis, predicted.  
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Figure 4: Perception of the European Union 2006-2012 (Eurobarometer 78, 2012)
 
 
 Figure 4 demonstrates how the perception of the European Union has declined over 
the last six years. The starting point of the positive perception of the EU is similar to the 
figures in 2004 discussed above. Already before the start of the global financial crisis a 
downward trend can be observed in the percentage of people with a positive perception of 
the EU. The trend does show a logical correlation between the crisis and the perception of 
the EU as a whole: as the crisis worsened, the perception declined. As we stand now, more 
people have a neutral perception of the EU than a positive perception, and the prevalence of 
negative perceptions has doubled and basically equals the positive perceptions 
(Eurobarometer 78, 2012).  
 This raises the question whether there has been a downward trend in perceiving and 
trusting the European Union specifically, or government institutions more generally. A similar 
analysis by Eurobarometer demonstrates interesting and hopeful figures for the EU. Figure 5 
portrays the amount of trust citizens have in the EU as an institution, their national 
parliaments, and their national governments. As can be deduced from this graph, the trust in 
the European Union has continually exceeded trust in national institutions. Even though 
there has been a steep decline in trust in governments across the board, the EU has not 
been more negatively affected than national institutions (Eurobarometer 78, 2012). Even 
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though the advantageous position of the EU has decreased, the trend seems more congruent 
with the notion of increasing depoliticization, and clears the EU of unilateral blame.  
 
Figure 5: Trust in EU and National Institutions (Eurobarometer 78, 2012): 
 
 
 In levels of support for membership of the European Union, as similar trend in visible. 
The question whether or not the citizen’s country’s membership is a good thing, figures 
dropped from a slight majority in 2004, to not even 50% in 2012. In 2004, after the 
enlargement of the EU with ten countries, 56% of citizens thought their country’s 
membership of the EU was a good thing (Eurobarometer 62, 2004). Luxembourg again 
constitutes the personification of ‘Europeanness’ with 85% support; the United Kingdom is 
again the predictable critic (38%) (Eurobarometer 62, 2004).  
In 2009, this support for membership had declined to 53%, which further decreased 
to below 50% in 2012 (Eurobarometer 78, 2012). Between different Member States the 
distribution of support remained similar, with widespread decreases in support 
(Eurobarometer 72, 2009). This does signify a clear deterioration of trust in and support for 
the European Union. This might not come as a surprise to most, but even further contributes 
to the existence of a public support crisis in the Union.  
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5.3.2. European Identity and Citizenship 
 
The concept of identity is complex and subject to an entire body of literature. In order to 
stay on track, the general line followed by the European Commission will be adopted here 
as well. The main question in this sense is to what extent people living in the European  
Union identify themselves with, first and foremost, their nationality or with their European  
identity. The variation in the extent to which Europeans feel European compared between  
2004 and 20121 will be the main focus of this section.  
 The European Commission  focuses its conception of identity on some core questions 
and factors they feel best define the concept. These questions include whether or not there 
is a real European identity, with which factors citizens identify, and whether European Union 
nationals are aware of their own citizenship (Eurobarometer 62, 2004). Moreover, issues 
such as recognition of the European flag, attachment with geographical entities, and national 
and European pride are encompassed in their analysis (Eurobarometer 62, 2004).   
So to what extent is there a European identity, and how has this developed over 
time? The most straightforward question linked with the existence and prevalence of a 
European identity is ‘In the near future do you see yourself…? Nationality only, Nationality 
and European, European and Nationality, or European only?’  In 2004, 47% of citizens see 
themselves as both national and European, while 41% considers themselves solely national 
citizens. Moreover, around 7% chose ‘European and National’  and a marginal 3% sees 
themselves only as European (Eurobarometer 62, 2004). Countries in which European 
identity is most prevalent include the island states of Malta and Cyprus (57 and 59% 
respectively), and Luxembourg (where 17% considers themselves only European). Among 
euro skeptic countries in this regard Hungarians (67%) see themselves most nationally 
(Eurobarometer 62, 2004).  
Following the trend of European identity to the latest point in 2012, through the years 
of severe crisis, a surprising increase in European identity becomes apparent. In 2012, 60% 
of Europeans regard themselves also as European citizens, and 38% see themselves purely 
as national citizens (Eurobarometer 77, 2012). Luxembourg again demonstrates the most 
prevalent European identity (85%), followed by Denmark (75%) and Germany (74%). The 
United Kingdom (with 42%) is one of three countries where the majority does not share this 
sentiment (Eurobarometer 77, 2012).  
 
                                                          
1 2012 is chosen here instead of 2009 because identity is a concept which does not develop overnight 
and needs considerable time to grow.  
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This variation constitutes a 13 point increase of the prevalence of some sense of 
European identity and citizenship, and a 3 point decrease in purely nationalistic identities. 
Especially with the crisis in mind, this seems like a substantial development. When over 60% 
of Europeans regard themselves as European, at least to a certain extent, even in this time 
of crisis, there is hope for the future of the European Union. A note has to be made about 
the measurements adopted by the Eurobarometer: the Commission changed the formulation 
of their measurement to ‘citizenship’ instead of the abovementioned question format. This 
might have skewed the results, because respondents can more clearly say they feel 
European citizens when questions are phrased without comparison to their national 
identities.  
A socio-demographic analysis of these results demonstrate that: young people, highly 
educated people, people with more ‘left-wing’ political beliefs, and people who know more 
about the European Union tend to see themselves as more European than the opposites in 
those cohorts (Eurobarometer 62, 2004). The age, education, and knowledge components of 
this analysis are hopeful for the future of public opinion regarding European identity. Public 
education on the EU comes out as an important strategy.  
 
5.3.3. The State of the Union and its Implications 
 
So where does the European Union stand now in terms of public opinion? As is quite 
apparent from just watching national news in most European countries, the EU has not 
gained any popularity in their tough task of combating the crisis. This is empirically 
confirmed by severely decreasing levels of trust, and a more negative perception of the EU. 
The levels of European identity and citizenship, in stark contrast, have positively developed 
(Eurobarometer 72, 2009; Eurobarometer 78, 2012). In this regard, most aspects have not 
only not improved with the attempts made by the Lisbon Treaty, they have even further 
deteriorated. There is, since the deterioration accelerated after 2008, an unmistakable 
connection between this deterioration and the ongoing problems associated with the 
eurocrisis.  
 There are, however, glimpses of light at the end of the public opinion tunnel: the 
trust EU citizens have in the Union still exceeds their trust in national parliaments and 
governments. This would indicate there might still be hope for the EU: citizens inherently 
complain about, and are mistrusting of, their governments. This trend is widespread and 
quite evident. The EU has, moreover, the opportunity to still develop towards something 
more trustworthy. Furthermore, the ideas and perceptions of the EU are not as deeply 
33 
 
entrenched as those about our national government. There is still some cause for optimism. 
If the EU can manage to include more citizens into the electoral process, educate its citizens 
about the benefits of the EU, can increase transparency even further, and can establish 
thorough and efficient decision-making, the possibilities of decreasing the democratic deficit 
can be taken advantage of.  
The most common values on which the feeling of European citizenship and identity 
are based predominantly include freedom of movement and the common currency 
(Eurobarometer, 2012). The practicality of these issues demonstrates the need to emphasize 
the practical advantages of being part of the EU to the citizens. Theoretical explanations 
such as the importance of coherence for the global balance of power, and the shared cultural 
and societal traditions do not affect public opinion as strongly as tangible and practical 
advantages. To win over European citizens for the European cause, they need to enjoy more 
practical advantages and be made aware that the origin of these advantages lies in Brussels.  
The top three objectives of European integration, as measured from the perception 
and desires of EU citizens, are: (1) boosting of economic growth, (2) increasing the standard 
of living of all Europeans, and (3) maintaining peace and security (Eurobarometer 78, 2012). 
These public opinions are congruent with the basic EU policy objectives, and should 
therefore form the center of European policies. However, public opinion generally ‘wants to 
have their cake and eat it too’. Sometimes difficult decisions need to be made in order to 
achieve the set objectives. If these three objectives are most important to European citizens, 
a more empowered EU would be better able to achieve them.  
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6. Counterfactual Analysis: What Would Further Integration Bring? 
 
What is a counterfactual analysis, and why is it useful for this study? Counterfactuals are 
‘subjunctive conditionals in which the antecedent is known or supposed for purposes of 
argument to be false’ (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996: 4). To make a counterfactual analysis, an 
author can for example replace the common question of ‘what happened?’  with the question 
‘what would have happened if?’ (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996). This form of hypothetical reasoning 
has been widely criticized for its non-empirical and speculative nature. The method, 
however, does have its merits: counterfactual reasoning is a prerequisite of any form of 
learning from history (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996: 2). The effects of something, or the lack of 
something, can only truly be assessed in comparison with an alternative or opposite 
scenario. Everybody employs this type of reasoning in one way or another, and choosing not 
to acknowledge this constitutes a concealed version of this analysis as opposed to an open 
version (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996: 2).  
  
Figure 6: Explaining the Counterfactual Analysis (Cederman, 1996: 249): 
 
      Reality 
 
 
 
                            g       
      ~X                                      ~Y 
 
 
Figure 6 graphically portrays a simple counterfactual analysis. A counterfactual 
analysis attempts to establish causation between an independent variable X (the antecedent) 
and the dependent variable Y (the consequent) by showing that the real outcome Y would 
not have occurred without the antecedent X (Cederman, 1996: 248). An alternative and 
hypothetical causal path from ~X to ~Y is then constructed to establish this path. The box 
represents reality, and the f and g are the required causal links and processes (Cederman, 
1996: 248). When the antecedent is hypothetically changed, as the counterfactual argument 
goes, the entire process of causation is altered as well. Hypothesizing on the path not taken 
is the core of the counterfactual analysis.  
X      f                    Y 
                    
           
H 
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In light of this study, the counterfactual question of what would have happened if the 
EU had gained more decision-making power is quite relevant in determining the path of 
future European integration. If the answer to this question would be that further integration 
would have promoted more distributive policies strengthening regions in the EU, would have 
led to more capabilities to tackle problems early on, and therewith would have addressed the 
problems of the democratic deficit, that would have major implications for the road ahead. 
This section will, through the process of an idiographic case-study counterfactual (Tetlock & 
Belkin, 1996: 6), explore the question of what further and deeper integration would have 
brought for EU decision-making. To conclude, the implications from this analysis will be 
applied to the notion of ‘what would happen if’ these capacities were to be installed now.’  
 
6.1. An Idiographic Case-Study Counterfactual 
 
The ideographic case-study counterfactual is a counterfactual technique that highlights 
specific points of indeterminacy at particular junctures in history. The method reminds us of 
how things could have easily worked out differently, and of how difficult it is to apply 
hypothethico-deductive laws to concrete cases (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996: 6). The path 
dependency of history on certain crucial junctures is the main premise of this type of 
counterfactual. The question of what would have happened if a different decision was made 
at one of these critical junctures is central in the analysis (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996: 7-8).  
The ‘what would have happened’ questions that can be relevant to understanding the 
democratic deficit and the functioning of the EU are multifold. One the one hand, the 
question of ‘what would have happened if the EU citizens had more influence on the policy-
making’ - in light of the most notable empirical example of the Dutch and French ‘no’ in the 
constitutional referendums - paints a gloomy picture. On the other hand, the question of 
‘what would have happened if the EU had more legitimacy and decision-making capacity’ 
would logically indicate a better capability to perform effectively, thus increasing support and 
trust. Moreover, the mechanisms of causation are subject to interpretation: did the 
democratic deficit lead to inefficient decision-making, or did inefficient decision-making lead 
to the democratic deficit? I am aware this section will raise more questions than it will 
answer, but these questions can be interesting threads for further research and debate.  
 Let us look to the model of counterfactual analysis in Figure 6. Applied to the 
scenario of European integration, the X stands for the status quo in the EU on the basis of its 
capabilities and democratic provisions (gradual integration until the Lisbon Treaty). The 
process f then signifies the evaluation of the functioning of the EU as followed, and Y is the 
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position of democratic deficit and policy gridlock the EU finds itself in today. The 
counterfactual analysis starts by creating the hypothetical ~X in which the EU has more 
authority to make decisions. This ~X will be the adoption of a substantively reform-based 
constitution in which political contestation of leadership is established, and further decision-
making capacity was transferred to the EU level (~X). The new outcome ~Y can be deduced 
by logically referring the causal processes (g) this new ~X would set in motion.  
 So then what would have happened had the EU adopted more far-reaching 
democratization, such as a hypothetical far-reaching constitution, resulting in more 
integrated and empowered decision-making? To trace the various causal mechanisms 
between the extent and nature of integration and democratization and the possible effects 
this would have, the defined dimensions of the democratic deficit will be analyzed. The 
argument will be presented that further democratization through deeper integration would 
have had a positive effect on the democratic deficit. The development of this deficit, as will 
be argued, is partly explained by both the lack of democracy and the hesitation to further 
integrate European countries.  
 For the first dimension of the democratic deficit, the initial answer to this question 
appears to be relatively straightforward: because of increased competencies placed at the EU 
level and the way this can increase the EU’s capabilities, factor ~X would have increased the 
effectiveness of the EU to take timely and decisive action. This increased capabilities would 
have enabled the EU to more effectively deal with the economic and financial crisis and also 
with the eurocrisis. This, in turn, would have swayed public opinion in the EU’s favor. 
Moreover, when political contestation with directly elected leaders and actively campaigning 
European parties had been introduced into the European electoral system, the democratic 
validity of the EU would have definitely improved. 
However, the answer to this counterfactual is more complex than that. Democratic 
influence into the policy-process does not guarantee more effective and decisive decision-
making. Often the increase in democratic input can hinder effective decision-making through 
the prevalence of more contradicting opinions. Considering this would be a step away from 
national sovereignty, European politics would become primary politics and therefore more 
conflicting. A strongly empowered executive, in the form of a possible presidential system, 
would, however, have been able to keep this processes in check.  
The second dimension of the democratic deficit, the disconnect between citizens and 
the EU in terms of ‘policy drift’ and ‘second-order national contests’ would have, logically, 
been  largely resolved by ~X. When European politics would have become more important 
and therefore more central to citizens’ interest, the policies that are central in the campaigns 
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would have become more clearly defined. This would have been comparable to a process of 
national elections, in which issues are very thoroughly debated in the public sphere. The 
‘second-rate national contest’ phenomenon would have been rendered irrelevant, because 
European Union elections would no longer have been of secondary importance. This would 
have, to a certain extent, also resolved the problems of the extremely low and still 
decreasing levels of turn-out for the European elections.  
Regarding the third, and last, dimension of the deficit: how would further integration 
(~X) have affected the public opinion in terms of trust, support,  identity and citizenship? 
This answer is more complex. Trust in European institutions, as we have seen in the analysis 
above, still exceeded trust in national institutions in 2012, even though no-one talks about 
democratic deficits on the national level. Speculating on how trust would have been affected 
by further integration, therefore, is extremely difficult. Regarding issues of support, 
citizenship and identity, the most likely consequence of ~X would have been a substantial 
improvement. As European politics would have increased in importance, the feelings of 
identity and citizenship, given that the EU decision-making would not have stagnated 
immensely, would most likely have steadily increased.  
Contestation, more generally, would have made issues more concrete in elections and 
therefore would have promoted the development of cross-institutional coalitions, which in 
turn can overcome policy gridlock (Hix, 2008: 101). Contests, moreover, are media-friendly: 
when media can frame elections in as a ‘horse race’, this will further improve the visibility 
and understanding of European politics (Hix, 2008: 101-105). Political contestation would 
also have forced the leaders to better explain their standpoints and policies to their 
constituents. When a visible leader would attempt to bridge the gap between the policy-level 
and the voters, this would have had a beneficial effect on how voters see, understand and 
value the EU (Hix, 2008: 99-100). This improved communication would have promoted 
engagement, decreased policy drift, and contributed to building trust in the EU, as well as a 
European identity. In short, even though this simple change would not instantly have 
resolved the democratic deficit, it would have been a step in the right direction for 
addressing almost all claims regarding the democratic deficit.  
These positive developments, however, would have been more likely to have a 
substantial impact on the way citizens perceive the EU, if the EU would really have become 
the primary political venue for all of Europe’s citizens. As argued by many, among which 
Peter Mair (2007), there has been a gradual process of depoliticization in Western societies: 
citizens are less engaged with and more often alienated from the political system. To expect 
them to truly be engaged by a secondary political system, is unrealistic. Substantial 
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integration on the basis of a truly democratic system, constituting a step away from national 
sovereignty, would be necessary to truly resolve the democratic deficit (Y).  
 
6.2. Relevant Implications: What Would Happen? 
 
The analysis above demonstrated that further integration most logically would have made 
the European Union more stable, more democratic, and more able to tackle severe and 
complex problems. But speaking in hindsight is inherently easy. Would further integration, as 
we have discussed in the theoretical portion of this thesis, impact positively on the 
democratic deficit of the EU and on its functioning more generally in the current situation?  
 Regarding all three dimensions of the democratic deficit, including the more general 
effectiveness of the EU, the introduction of factor ~X - provided that reforms are 
implemented efficiently – would still lead to more coherent policies and support for these 
policies. Further integration is still likely to facilitate the abovementioned positive changes in 
the democratic deficit, because the right form of further integration does address most of the 
claims made about the democratic deficit.  
The feasibility of actually implementing far-reaching reforms in the European Union 
constituting more capabilities for the EU and a step away from national sovereignty is, in 
time of severe criticism and crisis, extremely low. Public support for this kind of rigorous 
development would most likely be miniscule. However, citizens need to understand that the 
fact that the crisis has become so severe is partly due to the restraints put on the European 
Union. The EU is expected to deal efficiently and decisively with the crisis, while their every 
move in the process is questioned. Slow and difficult decision-making by national leaders, as 
is the main strategy at the moment, has not been very effective. Effective decision-making 
requires capabilities and legitimacy: as long as the EU does not receive these, the vicious 
cycle of the democratic deficit will be sustained.  
A stronger and more democratic EU, in conclusion, would have had unmistakable 
positive effects on both the way the system functions – more innovation, less gridlock – as 
well as the perception and understanding of European politics by its citizens. Simply making 
the EU’s leaders elected by the people is an important and, as I argue in line with Simon Hix, 
necessary step in bringing European integration into the twenty-first century. Hix argues for 
limited democratic politics in which the EU’s checks-and-balances safeguard stability and 
there is no direct democracy (Hix, 2008: 106). Where the argument presented in this thesis 
goes further is that these improvements are more likely to make substantial changes when 
EU politics are primary politics.  
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7. Discussion: Findings and Implications  
 
These various analyses have had mixed results. There is clear consensus that the Lisbon 
Treaty has made improvements on the first dimension of the democratic deficit. However, 
some core progressive changes such as a directly elected president and Commission have 
not yet substantiated. Moreover, the analysis of European Parliament elections in 2004 and 
2009 has demonstrated a more anti-European sentiment. This has gone hand-in-hand with 
steeply decreasing levels of public trust in and support for the EU. This decrease, however, 
has accelerated in the years after 2009, indicating that the eurocrisis, not the Lisbon Treaty, 
is the main culprit. Lastly, the counterfactual analysis, although highly speculative, has 
demonstrated how further integration would most likely lead to an improvement on most 
claims about the democratic deficit. These findings will now be discussed in more detail. The 
most important implications they have for the future of the EU will also be analyzed. 
 
7.1. Main Findings 
 
What have these analyses shown us with regard to the research question and the 
hypotheses? The research question, ‘How has the Lisbon Treaty affected the various 
dimensions of the democratic deficit within the European Union, and how can this deficit be 
resolved effectively?’, does not have one definitive answer. Regarding the general effect on 
the democratic deficit I feel confident making the claim that the provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty have to some extent positively affected the democratic deficit of the European Union. 
By strengthening the European Parliament and national parliaments, and by stimulating 
participation through the European Citizens’ Initiatives (ECIs), the Lisbon Treaty has 
improved democratic functioning of the EU institutions (Mayoral, 2011). Moreover, the 
increased importance of the EP has made European elections more salient (Schuck et al., 
2011).  
 The effect on the specific dimensions of the democratic deficit is mixed. As just 
mentioned, the first dimension of the deficit, the democratic functioning of the EU-
institutions, has been positively affected. This is in line with the proposed first hypothesis 
that the Lisbon Treaty had this positive effect on this dimension of democratic deficit. The 
H1 phrased in section 4.1 does therefore not have to be rejected.  
The second dimension, the disconnect between the citizens and the EU, has not 
clearly been affected one way or the other. On the one hand, the fact that salience and 
visibility of EP elections have increased, and that the actors and issues are increasingly 
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European points to a positive development since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. On 
the other hand, the enduring and accelerating decrease in turnout for the EP elections would 
signify an opposite trend. Keeping in mind the possible explanatory effect of depoliticization 
for the decreased turnout, the first trend seems slightly more convincing. Further analysis is 
required to determine the saliency of H2.  
The third dimension of the democratic deficit, which deals with public opinion, shows 
a very clear-cut deterioration of public support for and trust in the European Union. Even 
though there are slight improvements in the level of European identity and citizenship, the 
evidence clearly indicates that the extent of democratic deficit in this dimension has 
increased (Eurobarometer, 2004+2009+2012). This was in line with H3, and this hypothesis 
therefore does not have to be rejected.  
Lastly, the counterfactual analysis has outlined the hypothetical influence of further 
integration and democratization of the EU. This analysis, in my opinion, has demonstrated 
clear positive effects of further integration on the democratic deficit. Further integration and 
democratization would revolve many issues on all dimensions of the democratic deficit. This 
step would, naturally, cause many problems of its own, and its feasibility is very 
questionable, but even in times of severe crisis the possibility of integrating the EU even 
further must not be overlooked. The H4 does not have to be rejected.  
 
7.2. Implications for European Integration2 
 
The project of European integration has arrived at a paradox: public support for further 
integration has evaporated, making integration through democracy unfeasible. On the other 
hand, as has also been demonstrated by this analysis, further integration would resolve 
many of the problems associated with the democratic deficit. What now, should – and can - 
the EU do when the road to democracy does not go along a purely democratic path? This is 
one of the fundamental questions of European integration.  
Further integration has traditionally been instituted top-down, with very little regard for 
popular support. Because of the large consensus among the political elites, these sentiments 
against Europeanization have long gone unanswered. Now populist parties in many member 
states have voiced this disconnect with the EU, this has become a fundamental obstacle. 
Government has traditionally not been able to function efficiently when opposition to the 
government recognized the possibility of dissolving said government.  
                                                          
2 Since implications have been discussed in many individual sections, this section will succinctly 
summarize to avoid unnecessary repetition. 
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An interesting yet somewhat far-fetched analogy can be made with the nation-building 
process in the United States. In some regards, the American unification process bears 
resemblance with the growing divide between those in favor and those against European 
integration. The differences between these cases, of course, are vast, but the main point I 
want to get across is that the US, even though there was fierce opposition against 
unification, is now one of the most integrated nation-states in the world. Traditionally there 
has always been public resistance against the development of a more abstract and higher 
government structure. However, through a long process of democratic transition, gradual 
development can bring about fully-fledged democracies. Full European integration might not 
be achieved in the coming years, or even decades, but I believe there will be a point when 
true European integration will be a reality.  
Practical implications for European integration should be incremental politicization of 
European politics through the introduction of political contestation, an increase in capabilities 
of the EU, and more and better public communication from the side of the EU. Increased 
visibility of EP elections in Greece as a consequence of the EU’s direct impact on the country, 
and the highest turnout rates in Lithuania because of its large number of prominent 
politicians running for positions in Europe, should indicate that direct influence does create 
engagement. If this engagement can be facilitated in line with more positive perception of 
EU policies, the negative public opinion regarding the Union could be addressed.  
 
8. Scope and Limitations 
 
I realize the scope of this research is highly limited. Because of the vast arrays of literature 
on the functioning of the European Union and its democratic deficit, it is difficult to 
contribute to the existing insights and beliefs regarding this topic. In this study the 
assumption is made that the dissolution of the EU, and the halt of integration, is a non-viable 
option. Opposing this assumption would undermine the validity of this research.  
Democracy, furthermore, is a concept which is extremely difficult to measure. Moreover, 
it is challenging to make true causal claims about the specific effects of the Lisbon Treaty on 
support and trust in the European Union because of the intervening effect of, among others, 
the eurocrisis. It could, for example, be the case that on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty 
opinions vis-à-vis the EU have improved, after even more steeply deteriorating with the 
enduring crises in the EU. The counterfactual analysis, moreover, although I find it 
interesting and relevant, is highly speculative in nature.  
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However, this analysis does show the effect the institutional framework of the EU has 
on how it is perceived, and the mechanisms through which further integration can lead to 
more democratic support. Until now, the assumption that most EU members regard the EU 
as a given in international politics and will therefore continue in this institution, has survived 
the test of the eurocrisis. I stand by the contention that the EU will persevere. Discovering 
the optimal path for future European cooperation, therefore, is a dire necessity.  
Even though making such a pro-European argument in these times of severe crisis will 
most likely be received critically, the same crisis enables a thorough re-evaluation of policies 
and objectives. Thinking about the future course of European integration is urgently needed 
to ensure the EU rises stronger from the crisis. One can only hope that certain thoughts and 
arguments can slightly contribute to the realization European integration is not going 
anywhere. It is up to us to deal with its obstacles the best way we know how.  
 
9. Conclusions 
 
So how has the Lisbon Treaty affected the various dimensions of the democratic deficit 
within the European Union, and how can this deficit be resolved effectively? The Lisbon 
Treaty, as has become apparent from this research, has somewhat successfully attempted to 
address to ongoing problems of the democratic deficit in the EU. It has been able to correct 
some imbalances in the institutional framework of the EU by strengthening the capabilities of 
the democratically elected European Parliament. Moreover, is has tried to address the 
disconnect between the EU and its citizens by introducing participatory policies such as the 
citizens’ initiative (Mayoral, 2011). This has had various degrees of success depending on the 
different dimensions of the democratic deficit as defined in this study.  
The democratic workings of the EU (H1) have been improved by the abovementioned 
provisions in the Lisbon Treaty. This conclusion is not very contentious. Second, there has 
been a slightly positive effect on the visibility of EP elections through the media, which has 
slightly decreased the disconnect and policy drift (H2). This trend has, however, not resulted 
in higher turnout rates for the EP elections. Both of the posed hypotheses do not have to be 
rejected, although evidence for H2 is less compelling than for H1.  
With regard to the question whether or not the Lisbon Treaty positively affected 
public opinion (H3), inconclusive results were found in the data analysis. Both trust in the 
European Union, as well as support for membership have declined since 2004. On the other 
hand, the feeling of European citizenship has increased (Eurobarometer, 2012). This decline 
in popularity is largely based in the crisis, but can therefore not be convincingly linked with 
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the Lisbon Treaty. There might have been an initial effect, but this has not been 
demonstrated here. The counterfactual analysis, lastly, has attempted to demonstrate the 
hypothetical positive effect more democratization and empowerment would have on the 
democratic deficit of the EU (H4). These hypotheses, therefore, also do not have to be 
rejected, since the H3 did not predict an effect.  
This analysis clearly demonstrates that the future of European integration faces a 
variety of serious challenges. The emphasis here is not on how to resolve the ongoing 
eurocrisis most effectively, but on how to address the older and more entrenched problem of 
the democratic deficit in the European Union. Rodrik’s trilemma of the world economy shows 
that this lack of democracy is an inherent consequence of striving for economic integration 
while holding on to national sovereignty. Democratically supported integration on a European 
level is only feasible when national sovereignty is sacrificed (Rodrik, 2000: 179). A lack of 
awareness and involvement of European citizens further increases the democratic deficit.  
 Since the advantages of the European Union still outweigh the disadvantages, and 
the dissolution of the European Union would mean the exit of Europe from the world stage, 
further European integration seems to be the only viable option. A first step on this path is to 
address the democratic deficit by further democratizing the European decision-making 
structures. Introducing political contestation of leadership, both in terms of the President and 
Commissioners, is a necessary move.  
This is, however, not enough to counter the democratic deficit: until European politics 
are regarded as primary politics for European citizens, there will remain a disconnect 
between citizens and institutions. Public engagement with politics is rare on the now primary 
national level, let alone on the more abstract and distant European level. Further integration 
of EU politics to such an extent that this becomes the primary political stage for all EU 
citizens is the most feasible way to solve the democratic deficit problem in the EU.  
 Pleading for further European integration in a time of severe crisis, enduring EU 
criticism, and struggling Member States might be an unpopular argument, but it is, as I have 
argued here, the necessary path. The project of European integration still has more 
advantages than disadvantages: it addresses the common European good, and can 
safeguard a position of power for European countries which they otherwise would not have 
had. The absence of empowered leadership with the legitimacy and the capabilities to make 
tough decisions, in combination with strict regulation is what the EU needs in order to 
overcome these difficulties.  
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 There is a proverb in Dutch which states that ‘gentle healers make stinking wounds.’3 
This might not sound as catchy in English, but it certainly applies. Because of the consensual 
nature of European decision-making, together with a lack of legitimacy of its leaders and the 
decreasing popular support, the European elite takes compromised measures in a late stage 
of treatment. This has been, and will remain, an essential problem with the way the Union 
tackles crises such as the current eurocrisis. Capable and empowered leadership, with 
legitimacy through popular election, would improve the crisis management potential of the 
Union. Stricter regulation on national countries can, furthermore, prevent escalations such as 
Greece and Cyprus.  
The eurocrisis, to conclude, must be seen as an opportunity to dramatically 
reevaluate the course the European Union is on, and to address the entrenched problems 
within the European Union which under normal circumstances, keeping in mind the 
deliberative and consensual nature of European politics, could never be improved.  
 Further research into the implementation of the proposed scenario of pushing for 
further European integration is necessary in order to assess its feasibility. Moreover, 
coherent strategies into combating the democratic deficit are highly in need. The European 
Union, with its limited decision-making capacity due to its consensual structure and lack of 
empowerment, has troubles enough functioning efficiently. An increasing lack of public 
support is something that can possibly tip the scales in favor of the prevalence of national 
capabilities. I can only hope this thesis has contributed to the contention that this is not a 
viable option.     
                                                          
3
 The Dutch proverb: ‘Zachte heelmeesters maken stinkende wonden’ 
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